

Economic and Credit Implications of Nepal's Landslides and Floods

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Nepal experienced a severe late-monsoon disaster on October 4–5, 2025, when incessant heavy rainfall triggered widespread landslides and flash floods across eastern, central, and southern regions. The deluge caused dozens of fatalities (at least 47 confirmed), left nine people missing, and injured many more^{[1][2]}. Entire villages were swept away or buried under mud, and major highways, bridges, and power lines were damaged or destroyed, effectively cutting off the Kathmandu Valley and other areas from road access^{[3][4]}. The catastrophe struck just after Nepal's Dashain festival, catching thousands of returning travelers in transit and compounding the logistical challenges^[5]. Beyond the tragic loss of life, this disaster has far-reaching economic ramifications and credit rating implications. Key sectors, from small businesses and agriculture to infrastructure and finance are under strain. This research brief analyzes the impacts through four themes: (1) *Institutional response and disaster governance*; (2) *Business interruption and credit stress*; (3) *Infrastructure damage and public finance*; (4) *Agricultural and rural livelihood disruption*, with an emphasis on qualitative insights and policy implications.



Institutional Response and Disaster Governance

The Nepalese government's institutional apparatus was mobilized swiftly as the scale of the crisis became evident. Prime Minister Sushila Karki addressed the nation on October 4, urging citizens to remain vigilant and prioritize safety amid forecasts of continued heavy rain^[6]. Anticipating worsening conditions, the Ministry of Home Affairs declared an unprecedented two-day public holiday (Sunday and Monday) nationwide exempting only emergency services to keep people indoors and reduce road traffic during the storm^[7]. Government spokesperson Rameshwar Dangal justified this unusual measure by citing meteorological red alerts in over a dozen districts^[8]. The public shutdown, while economically costly, was a proactive governance step aimed at minimizing casualties and enabling responders to work unimpeded.

Nepal's disaster management institutions, notably the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Authority (NDRRMA), activated emergency protocols. All security and administrative agencies were placed on 24-hour standby for rescue and relief operations^[9]. NDRRMA, in coordination with the Home Ministry, took the extraordinary step of suspending long-distance vehicular travel to and from Kathmandu Valley for three days starting October 4^[10]. This effectively restricted movement on key routes to prevent travelers from entering landslide-prone highways. Chief District Officers (CDOs) in every district, along with army and police commanders, were ordered to remain in their posts around the clock to coordinate local disaster response, including helicopter evacuations where needed^{[11][12]}. The Home Minister, Om Prakash Aryal, emphasized that preventing human casualties was the top priority and instructed officials to focus on rescue operations while ensuring good governance and avoiding any malpractice or corruption during the emergency^[13]. He warned that any lapses could exacerbate public dissatisfaction, underscoring that transparency and efficiency in relief distribution are as important as the relief itself during crises^[14].

A notable improvement in disaster governance was the use of early warning systems. The Department of Hydrology and Meteorology had placed numerous provinces on red alert and issued flood warnings for vulnerable river basins^[8]. According to the Independent Power Producers' Association of Nepal (IPPAN), advanced flood alerts were disseminated in cooperation with the meteorological department, allowing many communities and infrastructure operators to take precautionary measures^[15]. IPPAN's President Ganesh Karki credited this early warning exchange with preventing casualties around hydropower sites: communities downstream were alerted and at-risk facilities were able to implement emergency protocols^[15]. In several flood-prone areas, authorities managed to evacuate settlements in time, for example, residents of squatter communities along the overflowing Bagmati River in Kathmandu were moved to shelters before floodwaters submerged their homes^[16]. Likewise, in Sunsari and Jhapa districts, police and armed forces rescued hundreds of people trapped by sudden inundation^{[17][18]}. These actions reflect a maturing disaster governance framework in Nepal that leverages forecasting and inter-agency coordination to reduce loss of life.

On October 7, once immediate rescue efforts had stabilized, the government convened a high-level meeting of the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council, chaired by the Prime Minister^[19]. This council brought together federal ministers, provincial chief ministers, and security force chiefs to chart the recovery strategy. It set out nine priority agendas, including expedited relief to affected families, reopening blocked roads, restoring power and communication services, providing compensation to families of the deceased and missing, and preventing post-disaster disease outbreaks^{[20][21]}. Temporary and permanent housing for the displaced is also on the agenda, indicating a focus on both immediate humanitarian needs and longer-term rehabilitation^{[22][21]}. Such high-level attention is critical for unlocking budgetary resources and policy support for reconstruction. The Prime Minister's active leadership and expressions of sorrow over the losses^[23] signal political commitment to the response. Furthermore, major political parties have pitched in: former PM Pushpa Kamal Dahal "Prachanda" mobilized his party's youth cadres to assist in relief efforts, and the opposition CPN-UML urged its rank-and-file to support local disaster response initiatives^{[24][25]}. This multi-stakeholder engagement of government agencies, political parties, and community volunteers illustrates a governance approach that is inclusive in responding to the crisis.

Despite these commendable efforts, the disaster exposed areas for improvement in governance. The rains triggered landslides in locations historically considered low-risk, catching some communities off guard. In Ilam district, for instance, residents were shocked to see landslides hitting villages on gentle slopes where such events were never expected^{[26][27]}. One massive slip in Sandakpur buried a home and killed a mother and daughter in an area locals believed to be safe^{[26][27]}. Such incidents highlight the need for improved hazard mapping and land-use planning by incorporating updated climate data to redefine what areas are at risk. They also underscore the importance of community awareness: even where government gave warnings, ensuring that local populations heed evacuation calls is an ongoing challenge (trust in alerts must be continually built). Additionally, the enormous scale of infrastructure damage strained the government's capacity. While rescue operations were effective, logistical bottlenecks emerged due to blocked roads and flooded airports, delaying aid to some remote communities. The governance takeaway is that disaster preparedness must extend beyond immediate response to building resilience: enforcing building codes on slopes, strengthening river embankments, pre-positioning emergency supplies, and investing in resilient infrastructure. As climate change makes extreme weather more frequent, Nepal's institutional disaster response mechanisms, though more robust than in the past, will be tested repeatedly. Continuous improvement in disaster governance, backed by clear policies and funding, is essential not only to save lives but also to preserve economic stability (as donors and credit rating agencies will observe how effectively Nepal manages recovery and mitigation).

Business Interruption and Credit Stress

The heavy rains and ensuing floods caused a near nationwide economic standstill for several days. With the government declaring Sunday and Monday public holidays for safety, markets, offices, factories, and schools remained closed across the country^[28]. In addition, physical disruptions severed the usual flow of goods and people: landslides cut off all major highways into Kathmandu^[3], and numerous regional roads were blocked or washed out. This meant that supply chains for goods from agricultural produce to manufactured items were paralyzed. For example, the arterial Narayangadh–Muglin road, a critical freight route, was shut down for two days due to landslides^[29]. In the capital, wholesale markets and retail centers were impacted as the main Balkhu vegetable market by the Bagmati River had to be evacuated and was left under water^[16], destroying stock for countless produce vendors. Many shops and small enterprises in low-lying towns were similarly flooded as local reports from affected districts speak of dozens of small businesses losing inventory and equipment in a matter of hours. Even government services were not spared: in Rautahat district, floodwaters submerged most government office buildings, disrupting public administration and court services^[30].

Micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) form the backbone of Nepal's economy, especially in rural areas and small towns. These businesses from agro-processing mills and poultry farms to retail shops and local manufacturing units typically operate on thin margins and limited cash reserves. The disaster's timing, right after the Dashain festival, meant many MSMEs were gearing up to reopen when the rains hit. Instead, many remained closed for days or suffered direct damage, resulting in lost income that cannot be easily recouped. For instance, 114 homes and small shops were inundated in Hoklabari, Jhapa when the Kankai River breached its embankment^{[31][32]}, and in Sunsari more than 50 local businesses were reportedly flooded (according to local officials' assessments shared via social media updates). These incidents illustrate the microeconomic pain: a rural grocery store or a small workshop that loses its inventory in a flood might face bankruptcy if it lacks insurance or access to emergency credit.

As MSMEs and farmers struggle, the repercussions are beginning to be felt in the financial sector. Banks and microfinance institutions (MFIs) in Nepal have significant exposure to the agriculture and small business sectors through loans and microcredit. A natural disaster of this magnitude elevates the risk of loan defaults and repayment delays, as borrowers in affected areas lose their income streams and assets. Borrowers who planned to repay loans after the autumn harvest or the festive sales season now find themselves with ruined crops or closed shops. This could lead to a spike in non-performing loans (NPLs) on bank balance sheets, particularly for regional rural banks and MFIs. Nepal Rastra Bank (the central bank) will likely encourage or mandate lenders to offer grace periods or loan restructuring for disaster-affected borrowers, as has been done in past crises. (Notably, after a severe bout of unrest in September 2025 that caused economic damage, the government rolled out relief measures including extended debt repayment timelines and concessional reconstruction loans for affected businesses^[33]). A similar

approach of easing credit terms can be expected in flood-hit areas to prevent a wave of insolvencies among small borrowers.)

From a credit rating perspective, the banking sector's resilience is a point of scrutiny. Fitch Ratings in its assessment of Nepal (when assigning the first-ever sovereign rating in late 2024) acknowledged that the country's economy is vulnerable to shocks and natural disasters^[34] and this vulnerability extends to financial institutions that operate within that economy. Fitch noted at the time that while Nepal's banks were generally well-capitalized, financial soundness was weakening slightly (a result of prior stresses) but "remains adequate" for now^[35]. The concern is that repeated climate disasters could accelerate that weakening by undermining asset quality. If a significant uptick in NPLs occurs due to this disaster, rating agencies might view it as credit-negative for Nepal's banking sector, potentially affecting any future ratings or evaluations of bank stability. That said, the overall banking system benefits from a large deposit base (fueled by remittances) and has historically shown flexibility in crisis times. Regulators will closely monitor liquidity and default trends in the coming months.

Beyond immediate losses, the floods have dealt a blow to business confidence, especially in the affected regions. Industrial estates and larger factories, while fewer in number than MSMEs, also faced downtime either from direct flooding or indirectly due to power outages and supply chain interruptions. Domestic air travel was completely halted for at least a day as visibility dropped and weather conditions worsened^[36]. Tourism, a sector that had just been recovering strongly in 2023–2024, took a hit as well: many tourists on the popular Langtang trekking route were stranded or had to be rescued due to trail avalanches^[37], and potential visitors may cancel trips upon seeing images of inundated cities and disrupted transport. This confluence of factors dampens economic activity and could shave a portion off Nepal's GDP growth in 2025. Analysts have drawn parallels to the impact of the September 2025 unrest, where normal commerce was curtailed; Fitch observed that violent disruptions "dampened near-term growth prospects by curbing normal economic activity and hurting consumer and business confidence"^[38]. Similarly, the psychological effect of the floods and uncertainty about infrastructure and fear of future disasters can cause consumers to spend cautiously and businesses to delay investments. For foreign investors and creditors, such events heighten the perception of Nepal's operational risks, potentially influencing country risk premiums. In sum, credit stress is not confined to loan ledgers, it also permeates the broader economic mood, which, if soured, can have longer-term implications for Nepal's creditworthiness.

On the policy front, there is recognition that extraordinary measures are needed to help businesses bounce back. The government has already set up a National Reconstruction Fund (as was done post-crisis in September 2025) and may channel resources into it for disaster recovery. Tax relief or subsidies could be offered, for example, after the prior crisis, authorities allowed affected businesses to import replacement machinery at 50% duty exemption and provided payroll support schemes to keep workers employed^{[39][40]}. While the October floods are a natural disaster rather than a man-made one, similar relief (such as temporary tax breaks, subsidized

loans, or grant support for micro-entrepreneurs) will be crucial. Donor agencies and Nepal's development partners might also extend targeted financial support for MSME recovery. The effectiveness of these measures will directly influence how quickly economic activity in the affected areas normalizes and how much permanent credit impairment banks suffer. If handled well, businesses can recover without defaulting en masse but if recovery falters, the drag of bad loans could constrain new lending and overall economic momentum. Thus, from a credit standpoint, the policy response to support MSMEs and borrowers is as important as the immediate humanitarian response. Rating agencies and investors will be watching how agile and generous the relief measures are, as they indicate the government's commitment to safeguarding the economic base and, by extension, its future revenue and financial stability.

Infrastructure Damage and Implications for Sovereign Finance

The October 4–5 disaster wreaked havoc on Nepal's infrastructure stock, raising concerns about the fiscal burden of repairs and the impact on the sovereign's finances. Transportation networks suffered extensive damage, effectively fragmenting the country for days. All major highways connecting Kathmandu to other regions were blocked by landslides^[3]. According to emergency reports, at least six key highways were fully or partially obstructed among them the Araniko Highway (toward the Chinese border), the BP Highway (linking eastern hills), the Prithvi Highway and Tribhuvan Highway (linking to the south/west), and the Narayangadh–Muglin road^[41]. Crucial road sections collapsed or were buried under debris, including known vulnerable points like Char Kilo in Sindhupalchok and sections of the Muglin–Narayanghat road which is one of Nepal's busiest trade arteries^[41]. Bridges were washed away or severely weakened by torrential currents^[4]. Hundreds of stranded vehicles and passengers had to wait until debris was cleared, highlighting how reliant Nepal's economy is on a handful of transit corridors. Local road networks, too, were hit: in Kavrepalanchok district, landslides and floods blocked roads in at least four rural municipalities, some of which have no alternate route and will take a week or more to reopen^{[42][43]}. Entire villages, like those in Mahabharat Rural Municipality, were cut off from road access, electricity, and communications simultaneously^{[44][45]}. The immediate consequence is a costly mobilization of engineering brigades, excavators, and construction crews to clear and repair roads. But the deeper implication is financial: reconstructing highways and bridges demands significant public expenditure, often running into billions of rupees, and often these costs must be shouldered quickly to restore economic connectivity.

Perhaps the most striking infrastructural impact was on Nepal's prized hydropower sector. Preliminary data from IPPAN indicated that 32 hydropower projects across 10 districts were affected by the floods and landslides^[46]. This includes 17 operational power plants (totaling about 180 MW capacity) that had to shut down generation and 15 projects under construction (about 338 MW) that sustained damages or saw construction works disrupted^[46]. The eastern hills especially Ilam district in Koshi Province were hardest hit, with the majority of local hydro

stations (ranging from small 3 MW run-of-river projects to larger 22 MW plants) forced offline^[47]. For instance, the Mai river cascade of plants (a cluster of projects on the Mai Khola) all had to stop operations due to landslides and swollen rivers^[48]. Under-construction sites faced setbacks: access roads to at least half a dozen hydro projects were washed away, and one nearly completed 10 MW project in Ilam saw its commissioning delayed after flood damage occurred just days before it was to start feeding the grid^{[49][50]}. The national power utility also reported damage to five major transmission lines in the 2024 floods^[51], and similar assessments are underway for this event (early indications are that multiple 33 kV lines and local distribution networks in the eastern region were downed). The outage of 180 MW is significant as it represents a chunk of Nepal's electricity supply. In the short term, it caused power shortages in some areas and forced Nepal Electricity Authority (NEA) to import power from India to meet demand, reversing Nepal's recent status as a power exporter during wet season^[52].

The financial implications for the energy sector are twofold. First, infrastructure loss: the Ministry of Energy's initial estimate for flood damage to embankments protecting hydro and irrigation facilities was about Rs. 100 million for 1.5 km washed away^[32], and that figure does not yet include the repair costs of the power plants themselves. In 2024's floods, the government estimated energy sector losses around Rs. 4 billion (nearly \$30 million)^[53], encompassing hydropower and transmission and the 2025 event, while affecting smaller projects on average, still likely incurs losses in the billions of rupees when totaling dam/intake repairs, machinery replacement, and rebuilding of access roads. Second, lost revenue and economic output: power plants being offline means loss of electricity sales (for private operators) and possibly penalty payments under power purchase agreements. It also means foregone export revenue as Nepal had started exporting electricity to India from surplus monsoon generation, but with many plants down, those exports paused. It was seen that after the 2024 disaster that hydropower, "considered a bright spot in Nepal's growth narrative," faces "alarming losses, turning the country from an energy exporter to an energy importer" in the aftermath^{[54][55]}. This reversal not only hits the income of energy companies and the government (which earns export tariffs and tax revenues), but also widens the trade deficit if Nepal must import extra electricity or fuel. Credit-wise, the stress on the energy sector could affect the credit profiles of some hydropower developers (many of which are financed by bank loans or have raised capital via the domestic stock market). Investors may grow more wary of financing new projects without stronger climate resilience measures, as "mounting climate disasters" are making them uncertain, potentially affecting funding for new projects^[55].

Telecommunications and water infrastructure were not spared either. Over the weekend of the floods, 312 telecom sites (cell towers) were knocked out due to power loss or physical damage, according to the government's 2024 post-mortem^[51]. This time, significant outages were reported in eastern Nepal; communities in parts of Koshi Province lost phone and internet connectivity for days. The Ministry of Communication and IT issued instructions to service providers to ensure backup and quick restoration, recognizing that information flow is critical in

disaster response^[56]. Likewise, water supply systems in various towns were contaminated or broken. Irrigation canals were destroyed by landslides in hill districts and breaches in dikes in the plains. Minister for Energy, Water Resources and Irrigation Kulman Ghising reported that multiple rivers (Kankai, Kamala, Lalbakaiya, Ratu, etc.) breached their embankments at dozens of points, leading to extensive flooding of communities and farmland^{[31][57]}. In just a few examples he gave: *the Kankai River's flooding in Jhapa inundated 114 homes and 500 hectares of paddy*^{[31][58]}; *the Kamala River's embankment break in Siraha-Mahottari caused Rs. 2.5 million in damage*^{[57][59]}; *the Ratu River's rampage in Mahottari washed away infrastructure worth ~Rs. 80 million*^{[60][61]}. These figures, while still preliminary, underline that beyond transport and power, the country's flood control and irrigation infrastructure has taken a hit costing ten of millions of rupees.

The cumulative destruction of infrastructure directly translates into substantial fiscal pressure on the government. Nepal's budget will need to accommodate immediate repairs (clearing landslides, fixing power lines temporarily) and longer-term reconstruction (rebuilding roads, bridges, and hydropower plants to proper standards). In the aftermath of the September 2024 floods (which were comparable or even more severe in some areas), the government's preliminary report put total economic losses at Rs. 17 billion^[62] (~\$127 million). Sector-wise, agriculture bore the largest hit (Rs. 6 billion), followed by energy (Rs. 4 billion), water and sanitation (Rs. 3.55 billion), and roads (Rs. 2.52 billion)^[53]. The damage to 37 highways, hundreds of telecom sites, transmission lines, and 16 hydropower projects was documented^[51]. The actual losses could be three times higher than the initial government estimate, potentially over Rs. 57 billion (roughly 1% of GDP) once knock-on effects were accounted for^{[62][63]}. In that event, it was projected Nepal's annual GDP growth might be reduced by about one percentage point due to infrastructure and productivity losses^[63].

Fast forward to the October 2025 disaster: while its full economic loss accounting is still underway, it hits many of the same areas and sectors, albeit with a slightly lower human toll. It is reasonable to expect a multi-billion-rupee reconstruction bill. The government's fiscal position entering this crisis is fragile. A former central bank official noted after the 2024 floods that "the government is bankrupt", pointing out it was already running a deficit, owing Rs. 40 billion to contractors (for previous projects), and had accumulated arrears in subsidy and insurance payments^[64]. This stark assessment highlights limited fiscal space. A new large spending need for disaster recovery, absent reallocation or external support, could compel the government to increase borrowing or cut other development expenditures. Indeed, a diversion of funds is likely as money earmarked for capital projects might be redirected to emergency works, potentially slowing medium-term growth. Such a scenario has credit rating implications: one of the reasons Fitch Ratings assigned Nepal a "BB-" (speculative grade) rating was Nepal's relatively low debt-to-GDP (around 44%) and strong concessional borrowing profile, but Fitch also explicitly warned that the economy's structural weaknesses include vulnerability to natural disasters^[34]. If disaster-related costs drive up public debt or derail fiscal consolidation plans under Nepal's IMF

program, rating agencies could turn more cautious. They will look at metrics like debt ratio trends, deficit expansion, and whether Nepal can secure grants/cheap financing for reconstruction to avoid straining its finances.

However, there are mitigating factors. Nepal's debt is mostly long-term and low-interest (thanks to multilateral and bilateral lenders), and the country had built comfortable foreign exchange reserves (covering ~9-12 months of imports)^[65]. This gives some cushion to absorb shocks. Additionally, the government's active disaster council and the likelihood of international aid (Nepal has historically received donor assistance after major quakes and floods) mean some reconstruction costs might not all hit the budget. Already, neighboring countries and international agencies have offered condolences and are assessing needs^[66]. The World Bank, Asian Development Bank, and donor nations may step in with emergency lending or grants targeted at rebuilding infrastructure. Such support, while adding to debt, often comes on highly concessional terms and can actually bolster foreign exchange inflows in the short term.

From a sovereign credit outlook perspective, the key will be how deftly Nepal manages the recovery fiscally. If the government promptly reallocates spending, shores up revenue (perhaps through fuel taxes or import duties that naturally rise with reconstruction imports), and secures donor funding, it can contain the budgetary impact. Fitch's latest (May 2025) review maintained a Stable outlook on the BB- rating^[67], partly on expectations of fiscal discipline under the IMF program. A deviation due to this disaster, for example, if the deficit widens much more than expected or if growth falters significantly could invite negative watch actions. Conversely, demonstrating resilience (both physical and financial) could reinforce confidence. It's worth noting that Nepal's ability to maintain a stable rating through the 2015 earthquake and past floods was due to its low debt and donors covering much post-disaster spending. That playbook may need to repeat in 2025. In any case, Nepal's policymakers are likely to prioritize restoring infrastructure swiftly because it underpins all economic activity and without functioning roads, power, and communications, the revenue needed to service debts and sustain the economy is at risk.

Agricultural and Rural Livelihood Disruption

The agriculture sector which employs over 60% of Nepalis and contributes around a quarter of GDP was devastated by the floods and landslides, dealing a harsh blow to rural livelihoods. This disaster hit at the tail end of the monsoon, during a period when farmers were awaiting the main rice harvest in many regions and had recently planted winter crops in others. The continuous downpours flooded vast swathes of farmland. Initial assessments are alarming: in the southeastern plains, flooding from rivers like the Kankai and Koshi inundated paddy fields just weeks before harvest. In Jhapa district alone, approximately 500 hectares of paddy fields were submerged when the Kankai River broke its embankments^{[31][58]}. Further west in Rautahat and

Mahottari, breaches along the Lalbakaiya and Ratu rivers washed away protective dikes and flooded at least 300 hectares of land, much of it cultivated, in just those localities^{[68][60]}. Hill districts saw terraced fields and irrigation canals obliterated by landslides; entire hillsides that were green with crops turned into cascades of mud. The Ministry of Agriculture is still compiling data, but anecdotal reports suggest heavy losses to the rice crop, maize, millet, and high-value cash crops (like cardamom in the eastern hills and vegetables in valley pockets).

Aside from direct crop loss, stored grains and seed stocks were destroyed as homes were flooded. Many farming families keep their recently harvested summer crops and seeds for the next planting in home granaries; when these houses were inundated or collapsed, those stores were spoiled. For example, in the Sunsari district floods, not only were 1,370 houses waterlogged or damaged^[69], but the accompanying high winds flattened maize fields and destroyed banana plantations, a cash-generating crops for local farmers^{[70][71]}. Agricultural officials in Sunsari noted that 530 hectares of bananas are grown in the district and detailed assessments were ongoing to determine how many had been lost^[71]. The story is similar for vegetable growers around Kathmandu who saw rivers like the Bishnumati overflow into their plots, and for tea estates in Ilam where landslides may have affected tea gardens (a vital export commodity). All this translates to a potential drop in agricultural output for the season and perhaps the year.

The food security implications cannot be overstated. With paddy, Nepal's staple hit in key producing areas, there is a risk of grain shortages that could necessitate higher imports. In late 2024, after comparable floods, the government projected an initial agricultural loss of Rs. 6 billion and experts warned of reduced economic growth, increased food prices, and ballooning food imports^{[72][73]}. We are likely to see a repeat pattern: higher food prices in the coming weeks and months. Indeed, the timing just before Dashain-Tihar meant that demand for food was seasonally high; the floods disrupted supply chains during this peak consumption period, which will put upward pressure on prices of vegetables, meat, and grains. Already, in some markets, vegetable prices have reportedly doubled due to short supply. Such inflation hits the poorest the hardest as one agro-economist noted, "higher food prices are especially heavy on low-income households, who already spend much of their income on food"^[73]. Thus, rural families who lost their own crops now also face pricier food in the market, compounding hardship and potentially leading to nutritional deficits.

Rural livelihoods often depend not just on crops but also on livestock (cows, buffaloes, goats, chickens) and fisheries. The floods took a toll here as well. Many families had to abandon their homes quickly, leaving behind livestock; reports have emerged of cattle and goats swept away by rivers or perishing in landslides. For instance, in the flood plains of Madhesh Province, dozens of cattle pens and poultry farms were swamped. While official numbers are pending, local disaster management committees have flagged livestock loss as a concern alongside human casualties^[74]. The loss of a pair of oxen or a milk buffalo is economically devastating to a subsistence farmer, representing years of investment. Similarly, fish ponds in the Terai were

overflowed, allowing farmed fish to escape and destroying an income source for those aquaculture farmers. These losses, though small in the macro sense, directly affect the income and creditworthiness of rural households as a farmer who loses livestock or a cash crop may default on a microloan or be unable to afford school fees for children, setting back human capital. It underscores how intertwined natural disasters are with development indicators.

The human face of the rural disruption is seen in the thousands of families displaced. By official count, over 5,400 people were directly affected in Sunsari alone^{[75][17]}, with 200 families in that district rendered homeless as floodwaters ravaged entire neighborhoods^[18]. In the eastern hills, villages in Ilam, Panchthar, and Sankhuwasabha have been partially emptied as people fled or were evacuated from landslide-prone slopes. The Kathmandu Post detailed how in parts of Jhapa (e.g., Shivasatakshi, Gauradaha), hundreds of people from dozens of households had to take shelter in schools and community buildings^{[76][77]}. Across the affected regions, schools have been repurposed as emergency shelters (authorities in Kathmandu Valley even put schools on standby for this purpose during the crisis)^{[78][79]}. Displaced families face an uncertain future as many have lost not just their homes but also the land that sustained them. The Disaster Management Committees, with help from the Red Cross, have been supplying food, clean water, and basic medicine to these shelters^[80]. But relief is a temporary salve; the rehabilitation of these families will require housing, livelihoods, and psychosocial support in the longer term.

A critical economic implication in rural areas is the effect on rural credit cycles. Nepal's farmers often rely on seasonal loans, either formal credit from agricultural development banks and cooperatives or informal loans from merchants for purchasing seeds, fertilizer, or even to cover household needs until harvest. The expectation is that the harvest yields will allow loan repayment. With the harvest destroyed, many farmers are now burdened with debt they cannot easily repay. This can set off a debt spiral, where farmers borrow more (perhaps at higher interest from informal lenders) to survive, thereby increasing future credit risk. Microfinance institutions, which have a strong presence in Nepali villages, could see a jump in delinquencies. In past disasters, the central bank has sometimes encouraged leniency, for example, after the 2015 earthquake, banks were allowed to reschedule loans in affected areas without classifying them as non-performing immediately. We may see similar measures now, but they only postpone the problem. Without a good harvest or alternative income, many rural borrowers could default in 2026, affecting the health of microfinance portfolios.

For the agriculture sector's credit implications at the sovereign level, consider that agriculture losses directly drag on GDP growth and export earnings, influencing government revenue (through lower agri-income and spending) and requiring higher spending on imports (food, seed, possibly fuel for irrigation pumps if rainfall patterns shift). A significant agricultural shock can thus indirectly weaken some of the fiscal and external metrics that ratings agencies monitor. The government might have to expand import quotas or cut tariffs to facilitate food imports, which could reduce revenue. In extreme scenarios, if food inflation runs high, there could be pressure for increased subsidies or price controls, which strain the budget further.

On a positive note, insurance could play a role in mitigating rural credit risk. Nepal's insurance sector is nascent but growing in agricultural insurance (crop and livestock insurance schemes exist, often with government premium subsidies). There are pilot projects in climate insurance that have shown promise in helping farmers recover^[81]. If those insured farmers get payouts now, they might avoid default and can reinvest in planting next season. Unfortunately, insurance penetration is low, but this event might accelerate the push for greater coverage as an adaptation strategy. It's likely that policymakers and donors will talk about scaling up "disaster risk financing" mechanisms (such as insurance, contingency funds, and index-based covers) to protect rural livelihoods – which, in turn, protects the rural financial system.

Finally, it's important to highlight that rural disruption has a long tail. The affected communities will need sustained support. Many will not be able to farm the same land if it's heavily silted or if irrigation channels aren't repaired and some may migrate to cities or abroad for work, leading to longer-term demographic and social shifts. The government's disaster relief agenda, as noted in the high-level council meeting, includes constructing temporary shelters and then permanent housing^[20]. Reconstruction of rural infrastructure (village roads, small bridges, community irrigation) will be crucial to enable farmers to resume activity. Organizations in Nepal's microfinance and cooperative network are likely to step in with rehabilitation loans and grants. The effectiveness of these efforts will determine whether rural communities bounce back next year or face protracted hardship.

From a policy and credit standpoint, building resilience in rural areas is increasingly seen as building resilience in the national economy. With climate change, what used to be "once in a generation" floods are happening more frequently, so there is a pressing need for climate-smart agriculture, elevated homes or grain storage, flood-resistant seeds, and diversified income for farmers. The Global Climate Risk Index consistently ranks Nepal among the most vulnerable countries to extreme weather^[82]. Credit rating agencies, while not directly rating the agriculture sector, implicitly consider these vulnerabilities in the sovereign risk profile. Therefore, how Nepal invests in mitigating rural livelihood risks (through infrastructure like dams and levees, insurance, or social safety nets) will feed into perceptions of its long-term economic stability. Encouragingly, awareness is growing as there are calls for Nepal to voice these concerns in international forums and tap into climate finance (e.g., the UN Loss and Damage Fund agreed at COP27)^[83]. Mobilizing such support could ease the burden on domestic finances and provide capital for building a more resilient rural economy, ultimately supporting a stronger foundation for Nepal's credit standing.

Conclusion

The October 4–5, 2025 landslides and floods in Nepal have been a stark reminder of the country's economic fragility in the face of natural disasters. At the national level, the event disrupted lives and livelihoods on a massive scale and yet, it also demonstrated some strengths in Nepal's response. Institutionally, Nepal handled the immediate crisis proactively, likely saving lives through early warnings and coordinated action^{[15][9]}. However, the strain on governance systems was evident, and the need for sustained investment in disaster risk reduction and climate adaptation is clear.

Economically, the disaster's imprint will be felt across sectors: businesses large and small face setbacks and rising credit risks, infrastructure losses have heightened fiscal stresses and will test the government's budgetary resilience, and agricultural communities have been hard hit, which could reverberate into higher food prices and greater poverty if not managed^{[72][73]}. The credit rating implications cut across these narratives. For the sovereign, repeated climate shocks pose a threat to growth and debt sustainability, a fact not lost on rating agencies that already flagged Nepal's disaster vulnerability as a credit concern^[34]. For banks and lenders, a spike in loan defaults in flood-affected areas will need to be contained to prevent broader financial instability. And for sectors like energy and agriculture, their recovery and future resilience will influence how investor's view project and corporate creditworthiness in Nepal.

In the policy arena, this calamity may serve as a turning point. It underscores that climate and disaster resilience are not side issues but central to economic planning and financial stability. Going forward, we can expect greater emphasis on constructing resilient infrastructure (e.g., building back better roads, flood control systems), expanding insurance and social protection for vulnerable populations, and integrating disaster scenarios into fiscal and development planning. The cost of inaction was illustrated vividly by the estimated 1% of GDP lost to a similar event in 2024^[63], a hit that Nepal, with its limited resources, can ill afford repeatedly.

Yet, within this crisis lies an opportunity: Nepal can leverage international climate finance and its own growing experience to create a more robust framework that safeguards both lives and the economy. For policy makers and financial sector stakeholders, the lesson is that investing in disaster preparedness and climate adaptation is essentially investing in Nepal's credit profile and economic future. A Nepal that is safer against monsoon fury will also be more attractive to investors, more creditworthy, and more prosperous for its people. Achieving that calls for vision and concerted effort, but the case for it has never been more compelling.

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